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 The scope of this research is intended to examine the effects of colonization under 
the two dominant empires of France and Great Britain over their former African colonies. 
Through this thesis, I will attempt to answer the following question: What effect did the 
differing colonial policies and institutions that were introduced by the French and 
British empires in their African colonies have on the transitions to democracy that 
these colonies made in the years following their independence? I will start this thesis 
by examining the literature that has been compiled on the colonial ruling practices and 
the tendencies of both the British and French empires within their African territories. I 
will then produce a case study of two different African countries, one of the former 
French colony of Senegal and one of the former British colony of Nigeria, and will 
examine how each country’s institutions of governmental administration, education and 
language, and judicial structure have shaped over the years since their establishments 
under colonial rule. I will then conclude by using these case studies to determine if the 
institutions that were adopted by the countries from their former colonial empires helped 
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Since decolonization, the continent of Africa in general has been plagued by 
underdevelopment, economic crises, political turmoil, and severe corruption. A majority 
of countries have experienced encounters with military coups that have taken over as 
governmental regimes, experienced horrendous civil wars and other violent events, and 
more. Other nations however, such as Botswana and South Africa to name a couple, have 
achieved numerous governmental successes, the promotion of peace and equality under 
law, and have been able to maintain stable regimes. What factors could have contributed 
to these different postcolonial experiences?  
When ruling over their respective African colonies, France and Great Britain both 
took different approaches as to how they handled the indigenous populations as well as 
the institutions they chose to introduce within their colonies. For this research, I am 
interested in understanding how the formal institutions that were introduced by the 
colonial empires of the French and the British have contributed to the transitions to 
democracy in modern African countries of Senegal and Nigeria after independence. 
By reviewing the literature, I will outline the key features of each of the two colonial 
empires in regards to their implemented institutions on how they administrated their 
colonies, the types of judicial structures that each metropole implemented into their 
colonies, and the systems of education that they established within their colonies, along 
with the languages through which education was to be conducted. The analysis of these 
general features of colonial rule will provide an adequate foundation to then further 
analyze individual countries from each of the colonial empires. I will examine the factors 
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that paved way for decolonization in Africa as well as the trends that most African 
nations followed post-independence, including their experiences with differing 
ideologies, different governmental regimes, and corruption. 
After discussing the existing literature, I will conduct two case studies to put the 
literature into action. I will study the countries of Senegal and Nigeria, the former being a 
former French colony and the latter a former British colony, in attempt to understand how 
their experiences under colonial rule from the two different empires have helped shape 
the administrative, educational, and judicial institutions that are in place in their modern, 
postcolonial form. I will evaluate the levels of democracy in my selected countries by the 
representativeness of each governmental administration, the presence or absence of 
authoritarian regimes or military coups during given periods throughout the nations’ 
histories, any societal uprisings that have affected administrative structure and policy, 
and other elements that could have affected democratization. With the findings from my 
case studies, I will conclude this thesis by comparing and contrasting how each of the 
influences under colonial rule have produced institutions that contributed positively or 
negatively toward each country’s transition to democracy and I will evaluate my findings 
in a larger context to explain the democratization trends on the continent of Africa. The 
uniformity of institutions that were implemented by the French, in terms of 
administration especially, appear to have rendered a more successful transition to 
democracy in Senegal over time compared to that of the British in Nigeria. Although 
these cases may be unique compared to other African experiences with the British or 
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French, this study helps contribute to the research on African democracy as well as 
colonial and postcolonial experiences.     
 
Fig. 1. Colonial Rule in Africa. “The Scramble for Africa.” n.p. Cabinda Free State, n.d. Web. 9 May 2015. 
Literature Review 
When dealing with the modern state of development in Africa, we must dive deep 
into the historical backgrounds and relationships each former colony experienced with its 
ruling empire. Although both the British and French occupied what were mostly non-
settlement colonies in Africa, their similarities in colonial policy tended to be few and far 
between. The differences between British and French colonial rule created a unique 
setting for future development and growth after independence was achieved in each 
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colony. It is important to understand the role institutions played in colonial life, notably 
the preservation of primitive institutions and practices and the implementation of 
institutions native to the ruling empires, to see how these institutions have shaped over 
time. Two different categories of institutions present in every society that we can 
observe. Douglass North (1991) defined institutions as, “the humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal 
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal 
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights),” (97). The British in general took a more 
hands off approach, allowing the continuation of several informal indigenous institutions, 
including native languages in educational and judicial contexts as well as the use of 
customary law, and also modifying newly-introduced British formal institutions to better 
suit each individual colonial environment (Ajayi: 1960; Grier 1999). The French, in 
contrast, treated their colonies as direct additions to the empire with the intention of 
having the colonies become complete embodiments of French society on a smaller scale, 
implementing strict language requirements, judicial institutions, and the formal 
institutions of French administration (Grier 1999). We will look at the literature complied 
by various scholars discussing the colonial experiences under both British and French 
rule, particularly the formal institutions of administrative practices and ruling methods, 
implemented judicial systems, and the policies regarding colonial education as well as the 
influence that the languages of the empires had upon educational institutions. 




I. Administration: Indirect Rule 
The major European powers, notably Great Britain, have had a place on the 
continent of Africa for several centuries, particularly since the explorations of the 
continent that were missioned by Portugal in the late 1400s (Whittlesey 1937). Up until 
the end of the 19th century, most European empires held a place in Africa notably for 
imperialist and trade purposes. However, the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 that was 
held in Congo paved way for further European expansion and influence on the continent. 
The conference called for the partition of Africa and set boundaries on African territories 
for the European empires to claim and divide, and the empires then established ways to 
rule their new territories (Athow and Blanton: 2002; Griffiths: 1986; Stone: 1988; 
Whittlesey: 1937). The British seized much of central and southern Africa and utilized 
this new territory to extract mineral wealth and cultivate cash-crops for the profit of the 
Metropole, or the British motherland (Babou: 2010; Rodney: 1973). Although the British 
utilized the resources within their colonies similarly as other European powers did, it was 
common policy for the British to approach their colonial rule fairly loosely. According to 
Grier, “it was agreed that the British government, and her agents thereof, should have 
total control over four areas: the constitution, foreign relations, international trade, and 
public lands. The last two were quickly eliminated, as the British did not want to give 
cause to rebellion or discord in the colonies,” (1999: 319). The British incorporated their 
doctrine of Indirect Rule in Africa, which was also commonplace in their other colonies 
abroad, and allowed many indigenous institutions to remain and thrive in their original 
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context, while also introducing British institutions that were often flexible to indigenous 
customs (Crowder 1964).  
Implementing British administrative policies and formal institutions in 
Anglophone African colonies varied slightly depending on the previous native social and 
judicial structures that the indigenous populations were familiar with, even if said 
institutions were traditional and informal. The British implemented a decentralized 
system of governing its African colonies and often relied on native chiefs, who were 
indigenous ruling authorities, to discuss policy and administrative goals within the 
colonies, and the British tended to let these local leaders call the shots unless the 
circumstances required direct British intervention (Crowder: 1964, Grier: 1999). As 
explained by Michael Crowder, “Though indirect rule reposed primarily on a chief as 
executive, its aim was not to preserve the institution of chieftaincy as such, but to 
encourage local self-government through indigenous political institutions, whether these 
were headed by a single executive authority, or by a council of elders,” (1964: 198). 
Some Anglophone colonies did not have an obvious form of traditional ruling style, so in 
these cases, the British intervened to the point of assigning or creating the roles of local 
chiefs or advisory boards, or in relatively few cases, the British needed to send in British-
born authority figures to rule over territories (Crowder 1964).  
The British did not put forth the effort to assimilate the cultural elements of the 
native Africans to resemble or model British standards and permitted the chiefs and local 
rulers in the majority of the colonies to interpret the British laws and practices in ways 
that would also accommodate the continuance of indigenous norms. The lack of desire to 
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assimilate the natives was simply because the British colonial system was established as 
an “economic plan focused on maintaining stability,” (Athow and Blanton 2002). Along 
with the absence of assimilation practices, the British had no intentions of granting any 
form of citizenship to the indigenous populace, even to those who were rulers of the 
various territories within the British colonies (Athow and Blanton 2002). The British 
made it clear that they did not expect their colonies to completely adopt British culture 
nor did they have the desire for the colonies to do so. Interaction between the British 
ruling elite and the indigenous chiefs was minimal and social relationships typically were 
poorly established between the educated Africans and the British (Crowder 1964). 
II. Colonial Judicial Systems 
The British implemented a relatively flexible policy in the African colonies when 
dealing with the judicial systems. Ajayi points out, “The very basis of ‘Indirect Rule’ or 
the indirect method of British administration by resort to the use of indigenous 
institutions meant that a total replacement of customary law by English law could not 
have been contemplated even as a long-term objective,” (1960: 108). The British 
influence had a very small effect on the customary law that was in place in the African 
colonies, more so in Western Africa compared to Eastern Africa. It was not a goal of the 
British to completely abolish the native laws and customs, and many of the judicial 
procedures brought in by the British sought to preserve many forms of customary law 
(Allott 1969). The British recognized indigenous tribunals and court systems, even those 
of Islamic origin in certain cases, which allowed this native institution of customary law 
to continue and thrive throughout the colonial era. These native courts tended to be more 
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structured and influenced by British legal practices in various parts of East Africa, and 
the legal systems in West Africa relied heavily on customary norms (Allott 1969). East 
African courts typically had a dual system in place: a set of indigenous tribunals 
supervised by British authority, and a set of standard, professional English-structured 
courts (Allott 1969: 13). British West Africa such as Nigeria didn’t necessarily have strict 
application of British legal practices and essentially relied on customary law as the basis 
for legal procedures.  
Informal institutions of customary law were typically upheld by British-
established courts and administrations if they were neither contradictory to natural justice 
and good conscience nor incompatible with legislation that was passed in the given 
territories (Allott: 1957; Ekow Daniels: 1964). Many British legal doctrines embodied in 
the formal institution of common law, especially the concept of stare decisis, were 
important in the evolution of customary law in the colonies. Often the British and native 
courts utilized formal or informal legal precedents, notably indigenous precedents if they 
were still relevant, when it came to ruling civil and criminal cases (Ajayi: 1960; Allott: 
1969). Fullerton Joireman recognized that common law systems, as introduced by the 
British, appeared to be superior when it came to the effectiveness of the rule of law as 
compared to the civil law systems that were introduced by other European empires, and 
she believes this difference could be the result of the British’s lack of a strong reliance on 
a strong, centralized bureaucracy that needed sufficient funding to carry out legal 
processes (2001: 591-592). These common law systems provided more rights for 
property owners, investors, and individuals, as well as provided more sufficient checks 
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on the bureaucracy and executive administrations because the idea behind common law is 
to provide the individual protection of rights from the state or governing body (Fullerton 
Joireman: 2001; Lee and Schultz: 2012). 
III. Colonial Educational Systems 
Education systems were weak and underdeveloped in all regions of Africa, but it 
appeared that the British were more accepting of the expansion of primary and secondary 
systems for native Africans and were more accommodating than their French 
counterparts. As stated by Walter Rodney, “British colonies tended to do on average 
somewhat better than French ones with regard to educational activities, largely because 
of missionary initiatives rather than the British government itself. Ghana, Nigeria, and 
Uganda were fairly well off as far as colonial education went. Of course, that was in a 
purely relative sense, and the absolute numbers involved were never large,” (1973: 383). 
The presence of Christian missionaries played a role in the pursuit of establishing 
educational provisions because they were the primary British group to push for the 
expansion of education within the colonies to gain more Christian converts by improving 
the literacy of the African populace (Omolewa 2006). In Nigeria, for example, 
missionaries collaborated with local merchants, who required educated and competent 
individuals to help with their affairs, to establish the first secondary schools in the region 
in the mid-1800s (Omolewa 2006: 267).  
The indigenous Africans in British colonies did not necessarily need to be of 
administrative or ruling distinction to receive an education, and many pushed the colonial 
authorities to grant more access to educational institutions than typically permitted by 
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colonial rule. Some British colonies experienced problems caused by too many African 
students completing primary educations which resulted in the shortage of economic 
opportunities for the educated and the shortage of enrollment space in secondary 
education facilities (Omolewa: 2006; Rodney: 1973). The educational curriculum that 
was implemented in the early 20th century was seen as ineffective and irrelevant by 
whites and Africans alike; many deemed the educational practices as being too European 
and impractical for the lives of the African students. Reforms were carried out in the 
1920s and 30s to establish a more useful curriculum for the average African student in an 
applicable context (Omolewa 2006). Many secondary African schools either incorporated 
or heavily relied upon indigenous languages and vernacular to conduct lessons and teach 
students, and the introduction of English into the educational environment varied 
throughout the colonies. Some African students were suspicious or even offended that 
they were not receiving extensive English lessons in school, assuming that the British did 
not think they were capable of learning the language efficiently or that their knowledge of 
English would threaten British superiority (Omolewa 2006). Whether these assumptions 
were true or not, the use of indigenous languages appears to have aided the Africans in 
order to gain a more solid educational background than those belonging to other colonial 
empires because they were able to learn new material in their maternal language, easing 
the learning process (Grier: 1999; Omolewa: 2006; Rodney: 1973). Finally, the British 
had tended to allow the training of indigenous peoples to assume teaching positions 
within the colonies, rather than solely sending instructors from Great Britain into the 
African colonies to teach (Grier:1999). 
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Overall, the British were relatively lenient with indigenous ways of live and local 
customs as long as stability was maintained within the colonies and there were no 
significant interferences with British imperial policies and procedures. Since the British 
did not regard the Africans as an extension of the British motherland nor were the 
Africans allowed privileges of British citizenship, this may have helped establish a 
newfound sense of native community within the Anglophone colonies since the customs 
of the Metropole were not strongly imposed on the Africans. Relationships between the 
British and Africans were typically not personal and interaction was normally carried out 
to conduct business or colonial protocol. It would appear that this type of indirect rule 
would aid in the promotion of self-sufficiency within the colonies, as the Africans would 
gain more hands-on approaches in regards to their interactions with the judicial and 
administration systems. Finally, since there was not a strong push to completely abandon 
native languages and tongues with the implementation of English, the Africans may have 
been able to mesh both colonial and native experiences together as an adaptation to a new 
way of live in Africa, although it may not have always been desirable. 
The French Experience in Africa 
I. Administration: Direct Rule 
In relation to the Berlin Conference, the French empire also solidified their 
influence on the continent of Africa. The French primarily seized control of West and 
North African colonies and similarly utilized the colonies for resource extraction to 
benefit the empire (Rodney 1973). In contrast to the Indirect Rule policy that was carried 
out by the British when it came to structuring formal administrative institutions within 
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the colonies, the French implemented Direct Rule, being more centralized hands-on with 
their approach (Grier 1999). Describing the French colonial experience, Whittlesey 
states, “In the administration of the French colonies Frenchmen occupy all the important 
positions, though properly trained Africans are allowed to fill subordinate posts, and in 
special circumstances even to become French citizens,” (1937: 363). Furthermore, he 
claims, “The French mode of administration is in theory the flat antithesis of the British. 
France is in Africa to make Frenchmen out of the Africans. To this end African life is 
given no official recognition. Administrative officers from France rule directly, native 
leaders being allowed to handle their own people only by sanction of custom, never of 
law. All land is French, except that which an individual African registers with the French 
authorities.” (1937: 367).  
There were significantly more French administrators residing in colonial 
territories compared to English, and the French less frequently relied on native chiefs and 
leaders to enforce laws and supervise over administration. Instead, the French created 
“cadres” or “chefs de canton” which were a select few Africans who received a French 
education and became part of an élite African group that was assimilated into the French 
culture (Crowder 1964). These educated Africans did not hold the same kind of power as 
traditional native chiefs would, but each one served as “un simple agent du gouvernement 
colonial central,” or one of many agents of the French government (Crowder 1964: 205). 
It did not appear that the indigenous Africans in these colonies placed the assimilated 
Africans in very high regard and the assimilated elite seemed to be merely “puppets” of 
the French government (Rodney 1973).  
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Up until the turn of the twentieth century, it was a primary goal of the French 
government in Paris to conduct a complete assimilation process in the African colonies, 
both procedurally and culturally, so the Africans could model the superior French culture 
(Grier: 1999; Rodney: 1973). The French came to the realization that total assimilation 
would not likely be achieved in as an overall goal in their African colonies because it was 
incredibly costly and required significant administrative bodies, so they transitioned to 
the model of politique d’association for ruling procedures. Even under this new policy of 
ruling the colonies, there were many elements of assimilation that remained intact and 
this new policy could have been considered a looser version of assimilation. African 
citizens were still encouraged to learn and speak French, and classes were still instructed 
in French, the goal to grant French citizenship to the “civilized” Africans still remained in 
place, and the French administrations that were established in the various African 
territories were all structured the same and did not take local and native customs and 
ways of life into consideration when creating policy (Crowder 1964). The French 
governmental framework was strict and left little room for the accommodation of 
indigenous traditions and structures of governance. The French did, however, encourage 
individual land ownership and various property rights were protected by the law 
(Whittlesey 1937). 
II. Colonial Judicial Systems 
Similar to administrative structure, the judicial systems that were implemented in 
colonial life were structured after the judicial institutions of France. The civil law system 
that was implemented emphasized the role of the citizen within the state and that the state 
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was the supreme element of which the citizen needed to obey (Fullerton and Joireman 
2001). Although there were some “customary” courts in action – customary law wasn’t 
necessarily customary (Mann 2009) – in the French African colonies, most of the courts 
were under the discretion of French authority. In 1881, the indigénat code was first 
applied in the colony of Algeria, and the French utilized this code throughout their 
colonies until roughly 1946 (Crowder: 1964; Fullerton Joireman: 2001; Mann: 2009). 
The indigénat was a system of laws used to rule over the native Africans and rulers could 
impose various different penalties on the natives if they acted against this code. “For 
nearly sixty years, the indigénat had enshrined administrative power and ensured that 
colonial administrators – particularly commandants – could inflict swift punishments for 
any challenge, real or perceived, to their personal authority and that of the colonial state,” 
(Mann 2009: 334). The code was reformed several times and finally by 1924 it contained 
twelve offenses that were deemed punishable if the indigenous committed them, one of 
which simply being the act of disrespecting France or French culture (Mann 2009). This 
code served as a factor of intimidation over the Africans, and the white commandants 
could use the code as a way to carry out punishment extremely quickly, often the same 
day that the offense was committed. Exemption from the code for select women and 
children began to grow in the 1930s, and eventually more and more exemptions were 
granted for various groups of natives (Mann 2009). For example, some natives who took 
an oath to the Christian religion fought for exemption because they claimed being a 
member of the church abolished their “native” status, and some natives that were granted 
positions of “neighborhood chiefs” which still under the elite African status gained 
exemptions from the harsh indigénat code (Mann 2009). With continued reforms and 
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exemptions granted, the indigénat system was legally removed after the end of WWII, 
although some commandants tried to hold onto this code after it was eliminated. Many of 
the chefs de canton were released from their positions at this time as well. Some of the 
indigénat policies still lingered within the colonies until they gained independence in the 
1950s and 60s. (Crowder: 1964; Mann: 2009). 
III. Colonial Educational Systems 
The role of education was generally limited in the French colonies and only the 
Africans who gave into French assimilation or were a part of the African elite were able 
to receive educations. The French structured the colonial education systems like those in 
place in France and they had French-born instructors sent over to teach courses. 
Schooling was primarily conducted in French; the students were introduced to the 
language as soon as they began their education and indigenous languages typically had 
no place in the French-structured classrooms (Rodney: 1973; White: 1996). The use of 
missionaries in establishing educational provisions also played a role in certain French 
colonies including Senegal, but due to the secular nature of the French ‘État,’ missionary 
work was not as heavily relied upon as was in the British Empire. “In 1922, France put 
forth a decree which further limited missionary activity in education. According to this 
decree, the establishment of a new school in the colonies required government 
permission, government-certified teachers, a government curriculum and the exclusive 
use of French as the language of instruction,” (White 1996: 11).  
Receiving the French-styled education broke down the barrier for natives to be 
considered as civilized, and these people often went on to hold the chief positions, such 
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as the chefs de canton and chefs de quartier (neighborhood), and were eligible to gain 
French citizenship in some cases (Crowder: 1964; Lee and Schultz: 2012; Mann: 2009; 
Rodney: 1973). The French saw their education systems as providing ways for the 
African students to transition into modern times as well as a superior civilization. The 
French believed that the Africans simply did not have the means of transitioning to a 
civilized society on their own and needed the help of French assimilation to evolve their 
culture toward modernity (White 1996). Although their policies were much stricter, the 
French demonstrated significantly higher levels of respect for the educated Africans 
compared to their British counterparts. In referencing the reflections of Abdou 
Moumouni, Bob White states that the French often treated the assimilated and educated 
Africans as they would their own sons (1996: 17).  
The French were much stricter than their British counterparts on the ways that 
they implemented formal administrative, judicial, and educational institutions. The 
concept of the French État is of upmost importance in French life because the centralized 
state is in charge of regulating virtually everything that has to do with government. The 
continuation of the French State into its African colonies extends the elements of a strict, 
organized French society, but whether the policies of assimilation and French domination 
have been influential on the evolution of African culture cannot be determined until we 
examine the modern-day implications of these colonial influences, and we will pick back 
up with this examination in later chapters.   





Several factors paved the way for African independence and decolonization. The 
ending of World War II also brought forth the weakening of the French and British 
empires, and the Pan-African movements that were already present in both the United 
States and throughout Africa were finally able to take root and begin to blossom. Both 
empires were well aware that ideas for independence were becoming a dominant way of 
thinking in their colonies and they both had no choice but to eventually oblige. British 
imperialism took a major hit once the Indian Empire was released at the end of the war, 
and African nationalist ideals were pursued (Binaisa 1977). African independence began 
its conquest in 1957 with the official sovereignty of the Gold Coast colony, which is 
present-day Ghana. By the end of the 1960s, the vast majority of African colonies had 
gained their independence and even had their own representation in the United Nations 
(Binaisa 1977).  
To achieve a state of independence, most Anglophone and Francophone African 
colonies were required to establish regimes that modeled liberal democracies, following 
“the metropolitan model,” (Crowder 1987: 18). While some genuine nationalist 
movements were present and wished to create accountable government in Africa, many 
of the African leaders who constructed constitutions reflecting the views of their 
colonizers did so half-heartedly and many of these constitutions were ignored or poorly 
enforced shortly after independence was issued (Crowder 1987). It has been clear to see 
that this idealized regime form did not pan out to be realistic but rather a fantasy for the 
majority of postcolonial African states and in its place there were many different 
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authoritarian regimes that swept over the African continent throughout the years 
following independence.  
II. Prominent Ideologies 
With the hopes of touching on the ideologies and themes of postcolonial African 
states, the concepts of Pan-Africanism and Socialism were two prominent features that 
were associated with African independence. It was believed that the unity of the African 
continent and interstate cooperation was an essential building block for economic 
development and prosperity (Marcum 1963). Socialism, with influences from the Soviet 
Union, was seen to coincide with the notion of Pan-Africanism due to various ideological 
similarities: “cooperation, egalitarianism, and liberation, and both draw inspiration from 
the strong myths of traditional communalism and contemporary nationalism,” (Marcum 
1963: 6). The Soviet impact did not directly affect the continent of Africa during the 
colonial period, but it crept into Africa through European communist parties that had 
some interaction within the continent, such as the French Communist Party (Gorman 
1984: 167). Ideals of socialism were successfully planted in many parts of Africa prior to 
independence and African nationalists utilized this ideology to further push for 
decolonization.  
In the years following independence, Soviet leadership was skeptical about the 
movement toward socialism in African because they viewed many of the African 
nationalists as products of a bourgeois society. As stated by Gorman, “If African 
leadership did not explicitly voice their solidarity with socialism, they were often 
dismissed as 'reserves' of imperialism,” (1984: 170). As time went on, however, there was 
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a newfound push for African socialist conversion and with that came the acceptance and 
flexibility of socialist development in Africa, even if the USSR saw various policies and 
practices as unorthodox (Gorman 1984). Some socialist and communist political parties 
were present in African nations, including Senegal. The Soviets began to offer 
scholarships to African students with hopes that they could provide socialist educations to 
Africa’s younger generations to further their cause. Some educational programs went to 
the extent of urging students to completely reject and criticize their current governmental 
systems in Africa, and the outcome of this pressure was mixed. Some students returned to 
Africa from their time in the USSR feeling disillusioned and refused the Soviet teachings, 
but even with some expressed opposition, many others embraced socialist ideology and 
advocated for socialist implementation in their countries (Crawley 1965). 
Socialism was initially attractive to Africans for numerous reasons. As stated by 
Seydou Badian Kouyate, who was a government official in Mali, in regards to the typical 
African condition, “You cannot be a capitalist when you have no capital,” (Pitcher and 
Askew 2006: 7). Above all else, many Africans believed that the adoption of socialism 
provided the following benefits: “(1) a language to promote the modernization and 
unification of emerging nation states, (2) centralized control of economic resources, (3) 
consolidation and expansion of the state, (4) emphasis on revolutionary change, and (5) 
international bonds to the wider community of socialist/communist states (promising 
economic, political and military assistance),” (Pitcher and Askew 2006: 7). Socialism 
remained an important ideology in Africa until the fall of the Soviet Union, and the post-
Cold War era is where we began to see the pursuit of democratic institutions and 
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principles such as privatization and political pluralism in many African countries that 
formerly clutched onto socialism. 
III. Authoritarianism and Corruption 
The vast majority of African regimes, including those with socialist ideologies, 
experienced some kind of authoritarian regime at one point or another post-independence, 
and often these regimes were mixed or hybrid. Authoritarian regimes are non-democratic 
and can be classified as personal or dictatorial, ruled by a single party or oligarchy, or 
military-ruled (Lai and Slater 2006: 115). A common distinction of many authoritarian 
regimes that began to seize power in Africa after independence was that they usually 
embodied the element of neopatrimonialism (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). 
Patrimonialism is a structure of rule that is based on the values of personal connections 
and loyalties and can be embodied through systems of patronage and clientelism (Pitcher 
et al. 2009). Those individuals who prove to be loyal and provide some kind of incentive 
or service for a leader is left with power, influence, or safety in return. In its neo 
condition, this system of patronage and personal relationships is seen at a bureaucratic 
and institutional level in a modern context.  
Scholars have inferred that neopatrimonialism persists in Africa because of its 
colonial roots that generated patron-clientelism behavior. “The survival of clientelism, its 
reconfiguration in an era of dependency and modernization, and its existence alongside a 
bureaucratic logic thus give the contemporary state its neopatrimonial character,” (Pitcher 
et al. 2009: 132; Bratton and Van de Walle: 1994). Neopatrimonialism, in opposition 
with the rational-legal authority that is discussed by Max Weber for deriving its authority 
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through law and impersonal governmental institutions, undermines institutional 
legitimacy and can lead to severe corruption and unchecked power for the leaders of an 
authoritarian regime (Johnston: 2014; Pitcher et al.: 2009). Political and economic affairs 
become intertwined, public and private property become difficult to distinguish, and the 
leader and the state become interchangeable. Many citizens who are not a part of the elite 
circle of influence often experience oppressed rights and little representation in political 
matters (Johnston 2014). In order to combat this type of rule, scholars have argued that 
political pluralism needs to become a priority as well as a dedication to respect the rule of 
law and the promotion of legitimate government (Johnston 2014). 
Along with authoritarianism and neopatrimonialism, the presence of military-
controlled regimes and military coups have also been seen throughout the post-colonial 
era. Authoritarian regimes do not necessarily need legitimacy to maintain power as long 
as they have an effective and powerful military supporting them (Keller 1996). However, 
if authoritarian leaders lose support or if rule becomes too unstable, the military has been 
known to step into power, expelling former leaders from their roles, ignoring or rejecting 
the constitution in place, and removing other governmental institutions (Anene 1997). 
Depending on the type of individuals that are leading in these military regimes, these 
coups can pave way for the transition to a different regime type and potentially 
democratization of the state, or it could lead to further authoritarian experiences. If 
military leaders prove to be autocratic, their own personal ambitions and motivations can 
certainly influence their policy agendas and can further promote corruption, instability, 
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and ineffective government such as the previous authoritarian regimes that held power. 
(Anene: 1997; Decalo: 1973).  
The role of civilian participation and appointments within the military is 
important in order to understand how a military regime can transition or further delay 
transition into a successor regime. John Anene studied the different levels of influence 
that civilian cabinet appointments in military regimes often experience and how these 
appointments can be a contributing factor of the “third wave” of democratization 
highlighted by Samuel Huntington that has been sweeping over African in the past few 
decades (1997). Anene claims that if, under an idealized form, military democrats and 
civilian democrats join forces and there is pressure placed upon military leaders for 
democratization as well as a structured removal of military agents from key governmental 
operations, the military will be pushed to initiate a regime transition (1997: 78). The 
civilian cabinet members will monitor and guide the transition through policy 
implications and eventually the military rule will be phased out and dissolved with a new 
civilian-led democratic regime in its place (although maybe not permanently). In contrast 
to a democratic transition, however, military coups can also utilize civilian cabinet 
positions to further the cause of autocratic leaders and can continue down an authoritarian 
path like previous regimes. Autocratic military leaders can still use a high volume of 
civilian appointments into positions of power, but there is often a high turnover rate as 
leaders seek to fill positions with civilians that also share autocratic tendencies (Anene 
1997). This creates governmental institutions that display authoritarian characteristics: 
little checks and balances on leaders in power, self-interested politicians and rulers, 
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corruption, and so on. Although the military regime is “civilianizing,” it could still be far 
from “democratizing” (Anene 1997: 77).  
The existence of military coups and regimes in Africa is far from subtle and a 
majority of the countries have experienced some sort of military rule since independence. 
Although military has engaged some civilian participation into the political system, it has 
often continued the abuses carried out by autocratic leaders as military personnel who 
have tried to pursue their own personal agendas, and transitions toward democracy 
typically have not had substantial successes following these regimes. Keller (1991) 
argued that true civilian rule of military forces without autocratic ambitions is necessary 
for strengthening the democratic institutions within a country.  
A commonality under authoritarian regimes is the weakness and oppression of the 
informal institution of civil society by the regime leaders (Bratton and Van de Walle: 
1994; Johnston: 2014). Civil society often represents nonpolitical associations and 
collaborations of individuals, whether it is through community organizations, religious 
groups, and so on that come together with a common interest and have the ability to 
directly influence political forces. Scholars have argued that civil society itself can be a 
key driving force behind regime change if it is formal and developed, as well as if the 
timing is favorable (Bratton and Van de Walle: 1994; Keller: 1996). After African 
countries gained independence, civil society and civic organizations faced two situations: 
they were either utilized by political institutions, or they were rejected and restrained by 
the ruling government (Keller 1996: 206). It is an observed trend that civil societies tend 
to lay low in regards to becoming involved in political affairs until political instability 
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becomes undeniable and crises emerge. Social groups can mobilize to control the 
political ineffectiveness and if their efforts prove to be cohesive and powerful, the ruling 
regime has no choice but to abide or try to fight off the social pressure with its own 
mechanisms of force.  
Assuming that civil society does have an impact in policy transition and is 
victorious over the incumbent regime, it is likely that civil society will die down again 
until there is another crisis that arises in the political atmosphere (Keller 1996). Civil 
unity and mass mobilization can be a contagious element and in many cases, it has 
proved to be an exogenous factor of regime transition (Keller: 1996; Wejnert: 2005). 
After composing a significant quantitative data set to carry out her studies, Barbara 
Wejnert determined that transitions to democracy are positively correlated to spatial 
proximity and that regional patterns through the diffusion process can influence 
neighboring countries to pursue democratization if others in the area already have 
(Wejnert 2005). She argues, “The closer countries are to each other, the greater the 
number of possible linkages through which democracy can be promoted or spread,” 
(2005: 56). Civil societies within one country that have pushed for democratic transitions 
can affect civil societies amongst other nations within proximity; there is not necessarily 
a domestic barrier.  
Although we have seen that spatial proximity and civic organizations can be 
driving forces behind democratization, this logic is not a science nor is it necessarily 
guaranteed for every African country that falls into these applicable categories. Africa is 
particularly interesting to study due to the fact that all regimes, even the ones that are 
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striving for the same outcome goals for their regimes, tend to be unique from all others 
and these differences are deeply rooted culturally and from differing colonial 
experiences. African regimes are products of their own individual histories, and many 
prove to be ‘hybrid’ in the sense that they can display overlapping combinations of 
parliamentary systems, dictatorships, military rule, and single-party governments 
(Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). These hybrid regimes can embody more democratic 
institutions and principles than others and can qualify as being more liberal or free than 
others. Some countries have implemented democratic practices early on after 
independence was achieved, and although some of these practices have died off after 
regime transitions, some have remained active and intact. “African regimes have varied 
in the degree of political participation allowed, most obviously, through the timing and 
frequency of legislative and executive elections. Postcolonial African regimes that have 
held elections have rarely limited the franchise,” (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994: 470). 
In general, political and regime instability was not uncommon throughout the several 
decades following independence for many African states.  
A final peculiarity, however, has been the recent stagnation of transition or 
progression for these African countries. As mentioned in previously, after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, there was a jump in democratization from the end of the 1980s to the 
mid-1990s, but after that, progression slowed and in some cases essentially flat-lined 
(Peiffer and Englebert 2012). Currently, many of the countries that were regarded as 
‘free,’ ‘partially free,’ or ‘not free’ according to Freedom House data, which is one of 
many organizations that assesses the levels of democracy and civil rights within 
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countries, remain in the same category as they did two decades previously. Peiffer and 
Englebert succinctly explain the modern African condition in the following manner: 
“While it is not unusual for regime characteristics to correlate over time within 
regions, such consolidation is surprising in Africa, not only because its more 
democratic regimes endure despite missing several of the alleged prerequisites of 
democracy (like sufficient income levels), but also because its ‘hybrid’ regimes 
seem to be in a state of equilibrium, neither transitioning towards more 
democracy nor reverting to the full-fledged authoritarianism they displayed before 
the 1990s. It is typical of these regimes that they hold regular elections and 
provide their citizens with some liberties, while nevertheless using autocratic and 
clientelistic means to maintain their effective monopoly over power. Thus, the 
large proportion of partly free or hybrid countries in Africa (at 48 percent the 
largest of any region in the world) has become a steady feature of its regime 
distribution rather than a stage in the continent’s course towards or away from 
democracy,” (2012: 358) 
It is difficult to determine what fate awaits Africa and its transitional stagnation. 
This thesis, however, is more concerned with understanding the current condition of 
select African countries and whether their colonial histories with both ruling empires can 
offer us insight as to why they have reached their current level of democratic 
development. The political and societal institutions that were inherited from former ruling 
empires and the ways that they were modified and utilized after independence are of 
particular interest to my research. In the remainder of this work, I will target and examine 
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specific examples of institutional adoption and modification throughout the years in my 
selected countries of interest, both from former French and British colonies, to see if 
there are any connections between colonial rule and modern application. We will look at 
the varying regimes that have held power throughout the post-colonial history, the 
evolution of institutions, the roles of civil societies, and more in attempt to understand if 
experiences with either the British or French empire could have aided their newly 
independent colonies toward more democratic successes or failures. 
Methodology  
After reviewing the literature that examines the formal institutions and policies of 
the British and French empires in colonial Africa, I will spend the remainder of this thesis 
identifying and analyzing the effects that the former ruling empires had over their former 
colonies after those colonies had gained independence. With Alexander George and 
Andrew Bennett’s book (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences as my guide, I decided to conduct a case study analysis of two African countries 
– one a former French colony and one a former British colony – to observe their political 
and societal histories from their independences to more current years. My goal through 
these case studies is to observe the implementation of democratic institutions and policies 
within these countries, and to determine if any lingering formal institutions or policies 
that were administered under colonial rule have inhibited or aided the transition to 
democracy within the Africa countries.  
The lingering formal institutions from the former empires that I will be examining 
as my independent variables for this research are those which were outlined and 
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discussed in my literature review: the administrative practices and ruling methods of the 
British and French authorities (which will be examined as the governmental regimes and 
institutions that were adopted upon independence and that evolved throughout the years 
that followed in the African countries), the various judicial systems that are present in the 
African countries, national education institutions and policies, and the languages in which 
education and administrative procedures are conducted. The successes of democratic 
institutions that have taken root in these African nations to determine the overall 
transition to democracy will be the dependent variable of this study.  
For the purpose of conceptualizing my dependent variable, I will use the 
definition given by Seymour Lipset that identifies democracy as, “a political system 
which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. 
It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making 
among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the 
population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative 
contenders for political office,” (1959: 70). With the research compiled through my case 
studies, I will evaluate the levels of democracy in my selected countries by the pluralistic 
or unitary nature of political parties and representation in government, the presence or 
absence of authoritarian regimes or military coups during given periods throughout the 
nations’ histories, any societal uprisings or wars that have affected governmental 
structure and policy, and other elements that could have affected democratization. For a 
final observation to provide a numerical standard, given by the Polity IV scale of 
democracy, I will examine the authority trends of democracy that have been assigned 
29 
 
since independence for both countries to give a visual overview of the process of 
democratization that has ensued, related to the countries’ postcolonial experiences. 
For my case study analysis, I will choose to examine the countries of Senegal and 
Nigeria as representatives of their colonial empires. Following the advice of George and 
Bennett, I selected two separate cases that had similar structures initially (being the 
models of administration adopted by the countries that resembled their previous colonial 
metropoles) to observe the variance that followed. Since the influence of colonial rule on 
the transition to democracy is my “phenomenon of interest” (George and Bennett 69), I 
selected two cases that were similar in terms of their postcolonial connection to their 
respective former empires. Senegal, being a former French colony, incorporated and 
retained numerous administrative institutions from France, and the Senegalese 
constitution that was drafted upon independence embodies many elements of the French 
“État.” The former British colony of Nigeria, although employing a federal system of 
government, retained numerous British institutions and policies such as a bicameral 
parliament, common law system, and so on. Furthermore, both African nations are 
regionally sub-Saharan and have strong Islamic ties that influence governmental structure 
and policy, which can present an interesting element of analysis as to how these two 
countries deal with the presence of Islam in their societies.  
My case studies of these two countries will attempt to answer the same sets of 
questions that will be applicable for both historical analyses (George and Bennett 86) to 
determine the role that colonialization under each empire has had on the process of 
democratization within Senegal and Nigeria. How have the formal colonial institutions 
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and policies of administrative structure, judicial system implementation, education, and 
introduced colonial languages versus native languages impacted the transition to 
democracy in these two countries since they gained independence? How have these 
formal colonial institutions and policies shaped political and societal institutions in these 
countries since independence? The next two chapters on Senegal and Nigeria will help 
answer these questions and draw conclusions for this research. 
Senegal 
Colonial Overview 
French intervention in Senegal before independence has similarities to the 
colonial standards that were traditionally implemented under the French empire in other 
colonies, but other conditions were present that were unique to the Senegalese case. 
Senegal presented a relatively standard case of French colonialism in regards to various 
policies and institutions that were initiated under the French empire. The judicial, 
administrative, and educational formal institutions that were pursued by France 
throughout its colonies typically remained the norm in Senegal as well. Although 
Catholicism was brought over by some of the French, secularism was still implemented 
in political policies. The French language was taught and used as the dominant language 
in schools, the Napoleonic Civil Code was adopted, and the French government sent over 
civil servants and other authority figures to preside over the colony (Creevey Behram 
1996: 281).  
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The level of freedom from French authority in Senegal, however, appeared to 
differ from other Francophone African colonies. Particularly in the Four Communes, the 
most urbanized areas in Senegal, the French allowed political activity to be carried out by 
the indigenous populations (Fatton, Jr. 1986 [2]). Although this political participation 
mostly came from the ‘African elite’ that received French educations, it sparked the 
beginning of an active political scene in Senegal. “Thus, unlike most ‘peripheral nations,’ 
Senegal experienced a rather ‘democratic’ form of imperial domination, and this 
decisively impinged on its postcolonial politics,” (Fatton, Jr. 1986 [2]: 299). Also, the use 
of French ‘cadres’ is particularly important while examining Senegal, especially in 
relation to its Muslim background. French North Africa is characterized with an Islamic 
presence, and the French interaction with Muslim groups traditionally was uncooperative 
and caused administrative obstacles for France. Senegal, although sub-Saharan, shares 
the presence of Islamic groups within the nation, and the relationship between the 
Muslims and French government was a bit different in this case (Creevey Behram1996).  
The French had difficulties collaborating with the Senegalese masses due to 
extreme cultural differences, and rather than dismissing or restricting local Islamic 
groups, French authorities relied on regional leadership groups who could moderate 
between the French government and Senegalese locals. These ‘moderators’ were local 
Muslim Sufi brotherhood groups who learned to speak French and could act as the voice 
of various local tribes and communities as representatives in front of the French State 
(Creevey Behrman: 1977; Creevey: 1996; Fatton, Jr.: 1986; ). Marabouts, as they were 
referred to, were utilized by the French to unify the various regions of the Senegalese 
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colony and to perform numerous tasks for the French government, such as tax collection 
and the promotion of groundnut labor and trade, which was Senegal’s chief export 
(Creevey Behram: 1996; Fatton, Jr.: 1986 [1]). From World War II to the Senegalese 
independence, the system of marabout authority was well-defined and structured so that 
the French would not have to interfere with local affairs unless an issue arose that the 
marabouts could not effectively control (Creevey Behram 1996). This reliance on local 
marabouts displays the French’s transition from complete assimilation to their policy of 
association in the later years of colonization and reflects the more indirect ruling policies 
the French pursued as independence was drawing closer (Beck 2001). The presence of 
marabouts in local and regional politics did not end once independence was gained in 
1960, and they continued to shape national policy in the years that followed. 
Senegalese Independence 
I. Administrative Institutions and Political Regimes 
Once the period of colonization came to an end, Senegal had a brief membership 
in the Mali Federation in June 1960 before becoming a fully independent nation in 
August of that same year (“Senegal Profile – Timeline” 2015). The nation was headed by 
President Leopold Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia. The two leaders were 
immersed in a bitter power struggle, with Senghor being part of the Christian minority in 
Senegal and representing a stanchly pro-French position, and Dia who was actively 
engaged in nationalistic policies and attempted to loosen the European economic and 
political grip on Senegal (Diouf 1992). After two years of sour relations, Dia attempted a 
coup d’état over Senegal, which was the only coup attempt in all of Senegal’s history 
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(Villalon 1994). With the aid of French forces present in Dakar as well as the support of 
regional marabouts who favored Senghor, Dia was arrested and removed from power and 
Senghor assumed the role as head of state, highly centralizing power and creating a 
unitary political system (Beck: 1997; Fatton, Jr.: 1986 [1]). Senghor’s party, the Union 
Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS), later known as the Parti Socialiste (PS), was the only 
political party with any kind of power in Senegal until 1976 (Villalon 1994). Although 
opposition parties were technically allowed under the constitution of the Second Republic 
of Senegal in 1963, the established “winner-takes-all” system made it difficult for 
opposition parties to have any kind of success in the government (Beck: 1997; Villalon: 
1994).  
Senegalese government under Senghor’s centralized leadership reinforced 
patronage systems and clientelistic relationships at all levels of the governmental 
structure. “The second Senegalese republic, proclaimed in March, 1963, led to the 
complete presidentialisation of the system under Senghor, giving him exclusive 
responsibility for elaboration and implementation of all national policy. His authority as 
president was further reinforced by the inclusion of Article 47 which gave him 
‘exceptional powers’ under certain circumstances – to be determined at his sole 
discretion,” (Diouf 1992: 119). All of Senghor’s staff and members of the bureaucracy 
below him relied on his authority to derive their own power and influence in the 
government, establishing relationships based off clientelism. The judiciary, the members 
of which were appointed by Senghor, and the Parliament, through which he would assign 
his own loyal party members to positions in the National Assembly, were not removed 
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from Senghor’s direct influence either (Beck: 1997; Diouf: 1992). Members of the 
bureaucracy operated in tightly knit patronage networks and ultimately carried out action 
and policy in the name of the Parti Socialiste to keep their positions of power within the 
government. “Consequently, all government and party officials, whether elected or 
appointed, were ultimately dependent upon Senghor's patronage, this fact blurring the 
distinction between their legislative, judicial, and administrative functions,” (Beck 1997: 
8). Patronage and clientelism existed even at the regional and local levels.  
The usage of marabouts to represent and unify local populations by the national 
government and by local constituents as well created a patron-client relationship, with the 
marabouts playing a dual role. The most powerful regional marabouts were incorporated 
into the PS political system and were responsible for acquiring support from locals for 
Senghor and his government, and in return the marabouts would be guaranteed political 
and economic stability and support from the political party (Beck: 1997; Boone: 1990; 
Clark: 1999; Creevey Behrman: 1977). Rural locals were especially reliant on the 
marabouts to make sure that their interests were being represented at the national level, so 
the marabouts played the position of the patron in this respect. The marabouts were also 
seen as the clients for the Parti Socialiste government and furthermore President Senghor 
because they relied on the government to secure their level of power and influence over 
their regions (Beck: 1997; Boone: 1990). Senghor’s regime remained in power a little 
over twenty years, with the help of the marabouts’ ability to secure enough rural votes 
every election to keep him in power (Beck: 1997; Clark: 1999).   
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Although Senghor’s regime faced very little opposition, there were still groups 
who opposed the Parti Socialiste and expressed dissatisfaction with economic and 
political conditions within the country. As unemployment and economic crises sparked 
toward the end of the 1960s, many strikes were carried out to push for administrative and 
educational reforms. Senghor responded to these uprisings in various ways, and although 
some repression was carried out by his regime, such as the arrests of some citizens and 
the declaration of a state of emergency to combat the strikes of 1968-69, he typically tried 
to refrain from using coercion or violent control (Beck 1997: 11). Something particularly 
interesting about Senghor’s rule is that although he was able to perpetuate the supremacy 
of his socialist party, he also began to lead Senegal down the path of political 
liberalization slowly but surely. In 1970, he decided to bring back the office of prime 
minister after the overthrow and arrest of Dia to decentralize his power over the executive 
branch and Abdou Diouf was selected for the position, who would eventually become the 
second president of Senegal once Senghor resigned his position at the end of 1980. 
Senghor also called to reform the constitution during the mid-1970s to allow for a basic 
establishment of multiparty politics within Senegal, with three political parties in place to 
represent the ideologies of socialism (his party), democratic liberalism, and Marxist-
Leninism (Beck: 1997; Diouf: 1992). Even with the additional representation of 
ideologies, the Parti Socialiste remained the most influential party in the Senegalese 
government, particularly within the executive branch, until the election of 2000.  
Senghor had altered the constitution before he left office so that his political 
successor would be the prime minister of the state (Diouf 1992). Many had opposed this 
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constitutional provision and viewed Senghor’s actions as countering democracy; 
nevertheless, Prime Minister Diouf was sworn into office in early 1981, also a member of 
the Parti Socialiste. While some groups in Senegal were opposed to Diouf’s presidency, 
the marabouts typically embraced the new president warmly not only because he would 
continue to pursue the Parti Socialiste platform that they were used to operating under, 
but also because he was a Muslim president and more removed from French influence 
compared to his predecessor Senghor (Clark 1999). While trying to curb disapproval of 
his presidency, Diouf continued down the path of political pluralism and legalized all 
political parties in Senegal within months of his inauguration, leaving the country with 
roughly 14 new political parties. He also legalized various labor unions, organizations for 
women, and economic organizations to help curb corruption and embezzlement (Diouf: 
1992; Fatton, Jr.: 1986 [2]).  
Marabout support was largely on Diouf’s side throughout the first few years of his 
presidency. However, with the establishment of new political parties, popular unrest 
began to form with the electoral process in Senegal and many argued that the PS was 
rigging elections in Diouf’s favor and still had unfair advantages with their domination of 
the National Assembly. Political and economic crises were on the rise toward the end of 
the 1980s and into the 1990s, and the beliefs that the Parti Socialiste had committed 
serious voter fraud during the 1988 elections had citizens outraged and the Diouf regime 
suffered from instability (Beck 1997). Many pushed for a modified electoral code to 
make national elections more consistent and fair for all parties, and in 1991 an Election 
Code Commission was established to create amendments to ensure freer and fairer 
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elections in 1993 (Beck 1997). Many of these newly established provisions were 
disregarded throughout various levels of the election process in 1993, and although Diouf 
won reelection for a third time, it would be his last. Into the late 1990s, some marabout 
leaders quit openly supporting the PS and the party itself continued to divide and lose 
support. There was low voter turnout in the legislative elections of 1998 and many PS 
party members deserted the party to join other parties (Vengroff and Magala 2001). 
Finally in 2000 during the presidential election, Diouf lost his final reelection attempt to 
Abdoulaye Wade, a member of the Senegalese Democratic Party, in the second round of 
elections that took place in March of that year. Although Diouf tried to retain power 
through his Parti Socialiste into the new millennium, his actions that pursued political 
liberalization since his inauguration eventually helped spark the events that led to his 
downfall. The Parti Socialiste also finally saw its political downfall after being the 
dominant national party for 40 years.   
Since independence, Senegal has been deemed an “état laïque,” or a secular state, 
by all ruling political regimes. This non-religious political affiliation from the state was 
directly adopted from the French model of government after the Senegalese encounter 
with it during colonialism. An interesting paradox to Senegal’s secularism, however, is 
that even at the time of independence, roughly 90% of the nation’s inhabitants were self-
proclaimed Muslims (Creevey Behram 1996). There has been a general acceptance of 
secularism in Senegal throughout the nation’s history. Although the marabouts were 
religiously affiliated, most maintained the notion that they were not politically motivated 
by their religious ideologies (Villalon 2004). Relations between the small Christian 
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minority and the Muslim population have typically been peaceful and accommodating in 
the societal sphere. Some radical Islam reform movements rose during the 1990s seeking 
political control, but overall they never posed serious threats to secularism within the 
nation (Clark 1999). When Wade took office, he made several changes to the Senegalese 
constitution in 2001, attempting to reestablish the characteristics of the government. 
“Most dramatically, the first published draft of the new Senegalese constitution proposed 
by Wade after his election omitted the term État laïque (the secular state). The omission 
produced an immediate and vociferous uproar in the press and among intellectuals, and in 
the final version the term was restored,” (Villalon 2004). The secular nature of Senegal 
remains intact and Senegal remains as one of the few completely secular Muslim nations 
in the world.  
II. Judicial Institutions 
The judicial structure of Senegal that is outlined in the national constitution was 
almost directly adopted from the French model. The constitution established a 
Constitutional Council, a Supreme Court, a Court of Accounts, and various Courts and 
Tribunals (Constitution du Sénégal). The most notable difference between the French 
judicial system and the judicial system in Senegal is related directly to the influence of 
Islam in terms of familial matters. “Before 1972, Senegal had several different law bases 
for its courts in uneasy co-existence. Family matters could be tried under French law, in 
traditional courts, or in Islamic courts depending on the nature of the issue and the 
interested party's own claim of affiliation…Like most rulers of independent African 
states, [President] Senghor was forced to find a consistent system of law to be adopted 
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nationally. The Code was his effort at providing a coherent national body of civil law 
although it is not based on one system but drawn from the three bodies of laws, with 
heaviest emphasis on French and Islamic laws,” (Creevey Behram 1996: 296). President 
Senghor adopted this law in attempt to standardize national law so it would work to 
balance out concerns from feminists and Western groups that were putting pressure on 
him to increase familial rights for women, as well as to accommodate for Islamic 
marriage and familial traditions. The Code de la Famille was constructed by the 
following provisions:  
“The Code spells out the specific rules and obligations of marriage, divorce and 
inheritance. Those who declare themselves not Muslim have a slightly different 
variation in what applies to them but many features are common and based on 
French law. For example, after 1972, all marriages must be witnessed by the civil 
service, either through a separate second (or preceding) ceremony or by the 
presence of the official at the religious ceremony. People may have Islamic 
marriages (in a mosque) or customary marriages according to local tradition or 
Catholic marriages in a church-but these were not legal unless registered civilly. 
Girls had to be at least sixteen and had to agree to the marriage. Muslims, self-
declared, were faced with a number of decisions. They had to decide at the time 
of marriage whether it would be monogamous or polygamous and both man and 
woman had to agree to this decision. No longer could men divorce women by 
simply declaring three times that they did so. Divorce had to be heard by civil 
court and permitted only according to a specific set of reasons such as infidelity, 
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or unalterable incompatibility. Women could equally bring suit for divorce in 
family court. Husbands were forced to pay alimony and child support, which they 
had not done, although they retained the right to determine where the children 
would be raised,” (Creevey Behram 1996: 296-97). 
This civil family code sparked much debate between both feminist groups and 
actively religious Muslim groups, both claiming in some way that the Code still didn’t 
accommodate for all of the desired goals. Women were still seen as inferior to men in 
relationships through this code, and some Muslim groups argued that this code was 
contrary to and even violated aspects of the Sharia (Islamic) law (Creevey 1996). 
Attempts to modify the code have been made throughout Senegalese history, and even 
under Wade’s presidency an organization was established in 2003 in attempt to reform 
the code but Wade struck down the demand (Villalon 2004).    
III. Educational Institutions 
The structure of formal education system in Senegal has remained incredibly 
similar to its French counterpart since independence. The official language in Senegal is 
French, as proclaimed by the Senegalese constitution, and although several other national 
languages are also recognized by the constitution, French remains the language that is 
used in all kinds of formal education. Much of the Senegalese elite at the time of 
independence received their education in France, and those who did not still received a 
French-based curriculum in Senegal (Schraeder and Gaye 1997). The Senegalese 
constitution, under Article 22, gives the right to an education for all children and the State 
has the responsibility to provide and establish public schools (Constitution du Sénégal). 
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Many Senegalese have argued that the French spoken and taught in Senegal is the 
‘purest’ in Africa and strive to continue the promotion of ‘la Francophonie’ to retain their 
strong standing in the Francophone world (Schraeder and Gaye 1997).  
Similar to those that took place in Paris during the same month and year, Senegal 
experienced education-related strikes by university students in the capital of Dakar in 
May of 1968. After observing the intensity of the French strikes began a couple weeks 
prior, Senghor was worried that Senegal would end up in a similar uproar and decided to 
declare a “state of emergency” once the striking began on his own soil. These strikes 
didn’t prove to be as effective initially in Senegal as they were in France, and educational 
reform didn’t make more significant strides until the Diouf presidency. Around the same 
time when Diouf was initiating policies to legalize labor and teacher unions, an 
educational policy was pursued to alter the old system. “Designed to replace the former 
educational system (which basically was inherited from colonialism), this new policy 
would be adapted to the socio-cultural specificities of the nation, and would reflect the 
needs of the population,” (Diouf 1992: 122). Although large improvements have been 
seen with the extension of education to Senegalese children and the continued practice of 
a rigorous French-based curriculum with modifications to benefit Senegalese students, 
the education system in Senegal is far from being perfected. “Formal education in 
Senegal continues to be conducted in French and resembles the French school system. 
While the formal education system has created a Senegalese elite, according to the UNDP 
Human Development Report (2002), around 62% of the population of Senegal does not 




The Senegalese case presents some interesting points worth exploring. First, 
although the republican form of democracy implemented and pursued during the ruling 
regimes of Senghor and Diouf, although flawed, proved to be rather enduring. Senegal is 
one of the rare cases in Africa that has been able to successfully curb any attempted 
military coups as well as maintain consistent authority over the nation. Even with 
presidential authoritarian tendencies, the widespread practice of patronage-clientelistic 
relationships, and an almost unitary political party system in place for four decades, 
Senegal has still experienced relatively low levels of political violence and has 
maintained stability within its governmental structure.  
Second, the concept of maintaining political secularism has appeared to have 
benefitted Senegal throughout history. While religious and ethnic wars and uprisings 
have plagued other independent African nations (such as Nigeria), the general respect for 
keeping the Senegalese government secular has reduced political backlash and limited 
oppression for Muslims under the law, as well as other small minority groups such as the 
Christians and traditional African religious groups. The centralized structure adopted 
from the French metropole and its secular policies to create unity within the state may 
have saved Senegal from serious social conflicts that could have damaged democratic 
practices and institutions that have evolved over time. Finally, the use of marabouts to 
serve as local representatives during the colonial era and their continued usage after 
independence helped create a uniform system of politics that the populous had become 
familiar with before the French removed themselves from Senegal. This continuation in 
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political practices helped ensure stability within the country and likely made the 
transition from colonial rule to independence smoother for the nation as a whole since 
procedure didn’t drastically change. 
Observing the Polity IV democracy scale for Senegal from independence until 
2013 (see Fig. 2), the experiences under Senghor and Diouf can be mapped out visually 
to observe the increase in democracy throughout the years. Despite the attempted military 
coup by Dia in the early 1960s, which can be seen as the green declining line on the 
Polity IV graph, Senegal experienced gradual increases in democracy under Presidents 
Senghor and Diouf throughout the forty years of rule under the Parti Socialiste. The 
transition of political power under President Wade’s election in 2000 further increased 
the level of democracy in Senegal, as the Polity IV ranking jumped from a -1 to an 8 in a 
matter of a couple years following 1999. Senegal’s democracy level has remained 
relatively stagnant since 2000, although experiencing a small decline around 2005, but 






Figure 2. Authority Trends, 1960-2013. “Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-
2013.” n.p. The Center for Systemic Peace, 6 June 2014. Web. 17 April 2015. 
Nigeria 
Colonial Overview 
British influence in Nigeria during the colonial era was somewhat unique in that 
the various regions of Nigeria were managed under slightly different ruling policies. All 
regions of Nigeria have complex backgrounds and ties with various ethnic groups and 
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unification of regions became more solidified in the early 1900s. Northern Nigeria, which 
was previously known as the Niger Territories of the Royal Company of Niger, was 
heavily influenced by F.D. Lugard, who later became the first Governor-General of 
Nigeria in 1914 up until his resignation in 1919. Lugard’s policies for the implemented 
form of rule in the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, once it was established in 1900, 
strongly embodied the concept of Indirect Rule that was well-known for the British 
Empire. As stated by Ikime, “The corner-stones of that system were Native Authorities, 
Native Courts and Native Treasuries,” (1968: 423). By the amalgamation of 1914, the 
three main regions that remained until independence were established in Nigeria: the 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the Lagos 
Colony and Protectorate (Afigbo: 1991; Elaigwu and Galadima: 2003).  
The southern regions of Nigeria experienced vastly different administrative and 
ruling institutions from the British compared to the northern region prior to (and arguably 
even after) the amalgamation. The Lagos Colony had been ruled as a Crown Colony from 
Britain since the mid-1800s and it received the direct implementation of various British 
institutions such as a legislative council and an Anglo-judicial system, along with the 
incorporation into the British commerce system and numerous Christian missionary 
groups who worked actively to convert the indigenous population (Afigbo 1991). The 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria had experienced less direct involvement from the 
British, although their presence was significantly more prominent than in Northern 
Nigeria. In southeastern Nigeria, the British utilized warrant chiefs that they appointed 
from the indigenous populace, but scholars have debated on whether these chiefs were 
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influential members of the traditional tribes or if they were simply used by the British 
because they were members of indigenous society that adapted more easily to British 
policies (Ikime 1968).  
Even with the usage of the warrant chiefs in the administrative procedures of the 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria which is seen as more of an indirect ruling policy, 
elements of Direct Rule were evident and there was a European presence that watched 
over the native institutions in action. An example of Direct Rule is that a British officer 
would be president over all of the native courts in the region and the British could sit in 
on the native tribunals (Ikime 1968). With the amalgamation of 1914, Lugard attempted 
to convert the three regions all to embody indirect rule by introducing the policies that he 
utilized within Northern Nigeria. “What in fact Lugard saw as the unification of the 
North and the South was the imposition on the South of all the systems that were 
operating in the North, to wit, Indirect Rule, Direct Taxation, Provincial Court, Land 
Law, etc. Nothing that he came to find in the South was considered good enough - not 
even the Legislative Council - for adoption in the North,” (Akpan 1978: 16). He also 
imposed a Native Court Ordinance to allow native courts to be unaffected by European 
influences and a Native Authority Ordinance to bring administrative power back to 
indigenous groups. Even with the amalgamation’s policy to create uniformity within the 
three regions, the different administrations still operated largely according to their own 
terms and policies that had been introduced there initially by British authorities, and the 
southern regions felt discontented because their established administrative procedures 
had been rejected and deemed as inferior under this new incorporated system.  
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Lugard had ultimately failed in trying to achieve a unified Nigeria during the 
colonial era, but it still set the stage for his successors to continue down the path of 
achieving unity (Afigbo 1991). The British were able to successfully implement a 
relatively unified military in colonial Nigeria that was headed by British officers, and the 
military remained rather passive and apolitical during this period (Amadife 1999). Aside 
from the military, however, conflicts over geographical boundaries and various 
commerce policies that existed between the different regions perpetuated until the end of 
decolonization, primarily with Northern Nigeria’s lack of access to the southern ports. 
“Grafted onto the regions, the political parties in government – the Northern Peoples 
Congress (NPC) in the North, the National Council for Nigeria and Cameroons (later for 
Nigerian Citizens) (NCNC) in the East, and the Action Group (AG) in the West – used 
the regions for effective competition,” (Elaigwu 1988: 175).With the northern versus 
southern rivalry and distrust, along with the ways that the British initially divided the 
colony of Nigeria up into regions and implemented differing administrative institutions 
policies, it seems inevitable that Nigeria would later adopt a federal structure of 
government upon independence so that each region could retain some of its own 
sovereignty and authority from one another.   
Colonial educational institutions policies also differed between the northern and 
southern regions. Most primary education in Nigeria and the standards for such occurred 
in the two southern regions, which had the majority of the colony’s Christian 
missionaries. Northern Nigeria was dominated by an Islamic presence (there were 
Christians in the north too, but they were definitely a minority), so the missionaries 
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settled in the south at large, and by making use of certain tax revenues, they were able to 
promote the spread of primary education and the English language (Patterson 1955). The 
promotion of education began to be seen as a necessity and a responsibility as the colony 
approached the years of decolonization, and Nigerian politicians in the southern regions 
sought to create and maintain universal education standards across the colony even before 
independence. Muslim schools existed in the north, but opportunities for early education 
were nowhere near as accessible compared to in the south, and women had even fewer 
opportunities in the north to gain an education. However, the southern system was 
imperfect and faced severe teacher shortages during the colonial era, making universal 
access to education unattainable (Patterson 1955). There was also a strong push by 
Nigerians to develop systems of higher education that were compatible to those in 
Britain, and universities slowly but surely began to make their appearance in Nigeria 
before independence was gained (Ajayi 1975).      
Nigerian Independence 
I. Administrative Institutions and Political Regimes 
Nigeria became an independent country in October 1960, and it was established 
with both a federal structure and a British-style majoritarian parliamentary system 
(Akindele and Oyediran: 1986; Suberu: 2008). At the time of independence, there were 
three regions and a capital, and a fourth western region was created in 1962, thus still 
leaving a huge Northern region and dividing the southern regions into three newly 
divided regions – the Western region, the Mid-Western region, and the Eastern region. 
The uneven divide of the regions from the colonial era left the Northern region with just 
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over half of the nation’s population and it dominated the representation in parliament. 
Even with the dominance in parliament, the southern regions had earlier and stronger 
connections to Westernized education systems from their colonial and Christian 
backgrounds and also had better economic opportunities due to their location on the coast 
with port access, which the north feared. As stated by Elaigwu, “It may be suggested that 
there was a relative division of functions between the North and the South that 
maintained some delicate balance in the political system. The Northern control of 
political power was counterbalanced by the South's monopoly of economic power in the 
country,” (2002: 75). Ethnic and political distrust between regions persisted throughout 
the next few years, and finally the civilian government was overthrown by the country’s 
first military coup in January of 1966 by General Ironsi in attempt to transfer strong 
regional governmental powers to a unitary power. Ironsi’s coup was replaced by General 
Gowon’s in July of the same year after violent backlash spurred from the North 
(Akindele and Oyediran: 1986; Elaigwu: 1988). Gowon sought to maintain the federal 
system but he did so under military rule rather than civilian rule, and created twelve states 
to try and even out the structural imbalance that was presented by the four existing 
regions since independence. The Eastern Region was still discontent with the structure of 
the government and felt that the Northern Muslims would try to eliminate the Biafran 
Christians, and the Eastern Region seceded from the federation in 1967 as Biafra, 
sparking the Nigerian Civil War that lasted until 1970 (Elaigwu and Galadima 2003). 
Until nearly the end of the century, it appeared that the Nigerian military was 
essentially the only element of the federation that was able to remain relatively unified. 
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From Nigeria’s independence in 1960 to the creation of the Fourth Republic under the 
1999 constitution, Nigeria was under military rule composed of several different coups 
for roughly thirty years (Amadife: 1999; Elaigwu: 2002). When Biafra surrendered in 
1970 and the sun set over the civil war, General Gowon still held power over the military 
and announced to the nation that his coup would be working on reestablishing democratic 
rule over the course of the next six years. Gowon’s power was cut short however and was 
transferred to General Murtala Muhammed in 1975, who “immediately undertook the 
most radical clean-up exercise in Nigerian history to rid the government and bureaucracy 
of corrupt officials,” (Amadife 1999: 626; Obi: 2000).  
Corruption still lingered throughout the government and military ranks in Nigeria 
over the years, especially with the creation of new states and local governments. 
“Subsequently, state and local government creation became instruments of political 
control and patronage. In these circumstances, states were created simply to spread 
centers of development evenly across the country, since new states were to have direct 
access to federal funding and to meet pressures for equal distribution between north and 
south and between east and west. The creation of states and localities ultimately became 
channels of advancement for the regional elites who occupied (or determined the 
occupants of) the resultant expanded political and bureaucratic positions that emerged 
from the exercise,” (Aiyede 2009: 255). General Muhammed himself, although active in 




Muhammed promised the nation that Nigeria’s government would be handed back 
over to civilian control on October 1, 1979, but he was assassinated in 1976 and wasn’t 
able to carry out the job himself. General Olusegun Obasanjo took his place and tried to 
continue with the transitional plans to civilian rule that Muhammed had put in place 
(Amadife: 1999; Obi: 2000). Under his regime, he was able to create a Federal Electoral 
Commission to regulate parties, membership, and campaign contributions for future 
elections. By 1979, five parties were able to participate in national elections and Shehu 
Shagari, the candidate from the National Party of Nigeria, was inaugurated as president 
of the Second Republic (Amadife: 1999; Elaigwu: 1988; “Nigeria Profile – Timeline”). 
His regime lasted approximately four years, and it was seen as a period of corruption and 
mismanagement of power and resources. It is understandable that the public of Nigeria 
began to distrust civilian authority, and by the end of 1983, the government of the Second 
Republic collapsed and the nation’s fourth military regime, led by General Muhammadu 
Buhari, assumed power (Amadife: 1999; Elaigwu: 1988). Buhari’s regime lost support 
quickly as it had passed several unpopular laws and did not try to maintain its 
accountability.  
Two years after gaining power, another coup d’état seized power over the 
military, removing Buhari from his position of Head of State (interestingly enough, 
although Buhari’s regime displayed authoritarian qualities, he would make his return into 
the Nigerian political spotlight about thirty years after his regime ended). General 
Ibrahim Babangida, the nation’s new leader in 1985, promised early on that he did not 
intend to overstay his welcome and wanted to remove the military from power as soon as 
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the nation was stable enough to do so, and was confident that his military regime would 
be the last that Nigeria experienced (Amadife: 1999; Obi: 2000). Babangida’s regime 
established and authorized two political parties in the country with the hopes of reducing 
corruption to prepare for future civilian elections, which were the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC). He also attempted to 
restructure the Nigerian economy, and increased the number of states in the country, first 
to twenty-one states total in 1987, and then to thirty states in 1991 (Amadife: 1999; 
Elaigwu: 2002). After delaying the presidential elections that were supposed to be held in 
1992 due to campaign corruption, Babangida allowed for elections to be held in the 
middle of 1993. The leader of the SDP, Moshood Abiola, was announced to have won the 
majority of the votes, but the results were annulled almost immediately by the military 
and he was never inaugurated (“Nigeria Profile – Timeline”).  
Babangida reassumed power only to resign shortly after, due to widespread fear 
by the public that he never intended to rid the nation from military rule. He was followed 
by his successor Ernest Shonekan who led the Interim National Government eighty four 
days until the nation’s sixth military coup, headed by Sani Abacha, took over at the end 
of 1993 (Amadife: 1999; “Nigeria Profile – Timeline”). Abacha planned to lead the 
country toward another transition that would render a civilian-led government by 1998, 
and although he initially suspended many political activities within the nation, he created 
a Constitutional Conference Committee in 1994 to begin drafting the nation’s new 
government that would take up when the military stepped down. Five political parties 
were also established, and all supported Abacha to run for president in 1998 when the 
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transition was complete (Obi 2000). Abacha ended up dying in 1998 before the transition 
was able to be completed under his regime, and General Abdulsalami Abubakar took 
power in July of that year. His regime transition was the shortest in Nigerian history, 
when he handed power over to a civilian government on May 29, 1999. During his short 
time as Head of State, Abubakar released political detainees in the name of human rights, 
constructed a commission to examine the constitution of 1979 and the one that had begun 
to be drafted under Abacha’s regime as well as a committee to review the stances of 
Nigerians to make recommendations to a newly drafted constitution, created the 
Independent National Electoral Commission, and established three political parties to be 
active in the upcoming elections (Obi 2000). After elections had been held in 1999, 
Abubakar stepped down from power and Olusegun Obasanjo, who had been the military 
ruler in power that handed over power to President Shagari in 1979, was sworn into 
office on May 29th as the first President of the Fourth Republic (“Nigeria Profile – 
Timeline;” Obi: 2000).  
The 1999 constitution has several key features. It recognizes the thirty six states 
that were created since independence, along with the federal capital of Abuja that is 
located almost in the direct center of the country, and 774 local governments. Nigeria 
experienced a relatively weak center of the federation in the years that followed 
independence, but several factors that the country experienced throughout its nearly-forty 
year trek toward a democratic government led to the increase of the national 
government’s power as of 1999. These factors included the nation’s experience with 
military rule, the civil war, the creation of states that established more governing bodies 
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throughout the country, a desire by the public for federal stability and unity, and 
international trade and globalization (Aiyede: 2009; Elaigwu: 2002). The federal 
government has a National Assembly, composed of a Senate and a House of 
Representatives, as well as a federal executive branch, headed by a national president. 
Similarly, each state has its own House of Assembly for local legislative representatives, 
and a state executive branch that is headed by a governor. The federal government is in 
charge of federal finances, interstate commerce, raising and funding the military, and so 
on, and the state governments are responsible for similar things at the state and local 
levels (Aiyede: 2009; Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). The 
Nigerian Constitution also abstains from adopting a national religion, but accommodates 
for various religions through its judicial system (see the section “Judicial Policies”).  
With the adoption of the new constitution in 1999, the issues that had led Nigerian 
politicians to adopt a federal structure for the nation were still very much prevalent, with 
ethnic and regional groups being weary of one another. At the turn of the century, 
Nigerian politicians at all three tiers of administrative government were uncertain on how 
the distribution of power would play out, and desperately wishing to avoid a second civil 
war, relations amongst these three different governments could be rocky as each level 
tried to establish their jurisdictions of power in action (Elaigwu 2002). It is likely that as 
the country progresses down the path of democracy, with the creation and maintenance of 
democratic institutions, power from the federal government will slowly begin weaken as 
it shifts more to subnational governments. However, as ethnic conflicts are still present in 
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modern times, the federal government will always have a strong role to ensure national 
peace and unity.      
II. Judicial Institutions 
Before Nigeria gained independence, the colony had utilized several different 
judicial systems to rule over the indigenous populace. Given that the northern region had 
the largest Islamic population, the British authorities had allowed for the freedom of 
religion within the area to ensure peaceful colonization, and thus this religious flexibility 
meant that the judicial system could be influenced by informal Islamic institutions and 
principles. The practice of Sharia law, which is seen as the law of God, was adopted in 
Northern Nigeria, and by the time of independence in 1960, Northern Nigeria was the 
only location in the world outside of Arabia that enforced Sharia law in both criminal and 
civil matters (Elaigwu and Galadima 2003: 126). The British common law system was 
also adopted at the time of independence, but many northern Muslims felt that this 
system of law was not compatible with their lifestyles. The different constitutions of 
Nigeria have been crafted so that both common law and Sharia law can have a place in 
society to accommodate for all citizens’ legal needs. This judicial plurality has lasted 
throughout Nigeria’s history and still holds in the current constitution.  
The Constitution of 1999 provides for a Supreme Court of Nigeria, a Court of 
Appeals, a Federal High Court, a High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, a High 
Court of a state, a Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Territory, a Sharia Court of 
Appeal of a state, a Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, and a 
Customary Court of Appeal of a state (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
56 
 
1999; Nmehielle: 2004). Initially, Islamic law was limited to civil cases that often 
involved matters such as marriage, and it was used as a form of customary law that could 
be applied to Muslims. The formal Penal Code was what directly applied to criminal 
cases within Nigeria. However, after the draft of the Fourth Republic’s constitution, 
several governors in Northern Nigeria declared the complete adoption of Sharia law 
within their states. Currently, there are twelve Nigerian states that either have full Sharia 
law or apply it in regions where the Muslim population is dominant (Elaigwu and 
Galadima: 2003; Nmehielle: 2004). The full implementation of Sharia law in the various 
states has sparked ethnic, religious, and political backlash, and there is still a debate about 
whether the states have the constitutional authority to allow religious courts to have 
complete implementation since Nigeria is constitutionally a secular nation. There have 
also been human rights concerns over the punishments that have been proscribed under 
Sharia law in the 21st century. In 2002, two separate cases of women committing adultery 
were sentenced to death by stoning under Sharia law, and thanks to public outcry and the 
overturn of the ruling by an Appeals Court, the women’s lives were spared. Debates over 
Sharia law have branched out to the international arena, and there are concerns that these 
laws are unfavorable for women’s rights and equality (Nmehielle 2004). 
The informal institution of customary courts within Nigeria varies between the 
differing regions, and still carries out practices of former indigenous tribes from the area. 
Although the formal common law institution that was adopted from the British has 
become quite common as the main court system outside of Sharia, many customary 
courts still are operational, or principles of former customary courts are still in practice. 
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Using one of many circumstances of indigenous legal practice as an example, a 
customary practice that is still commonly used in the eastern regions within Igbo 
populations is the use of juju oaths rather than English-style oaths to ensure that the 
person testifying is telling the truth. These juju oaths are sworn against oneself in a 
fearful manner, and this is a way for the person to make sure that they tell the truth or else 
they will be cursed and punished by their own juju. Many different supernatural believes 
hold a place in African customary law in general (Oba 2008). Finally, the use of an 
adopted British-style formal judicial system is still very much prevalent in Nigeria and 
has been incorporated directly into the constitution. The Federal Supreme Court, the 
Federal Court of Appeals, and the Federal High Court, as well as the courts of appeal and 
high courts within each state (beside the twelve who have adopted Sharia) all operate 
according to common law principles, which embody legal doctrines of equality under law 
(Nmehielle 2004). Even with Nigeria’s rich plurality of judicial systems in place to 
accommodate different groups, it has been seen that the country’s rule of law ranking is 
still one of the worst throughout the world (Daniels et al. 2011). 
III. Educational Institutions 
The most current Constitution of Nigeria states, “The Government shall direct its 
policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all 
levels,” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Section 18). In 1976, the 
government enacted the Universal Primary Education Scheme, with the goal of providing 
free primary level education across the nation. Due to the fact that Nigeria is one of the 
most linguistically diverse countries on the continent of Africa, the governmental has also 
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allowed for the promotion of various languages in the education system. The three most 
common indigenous languages (Hausa in the north, Yoruba in the southwest, and Igbo in 
the southeast) are used at the primary level throughout the nation, and it became standard 
in the 1980s to use the most dominant native language for at least the first three years of 
primary education, and then to use English for as a supplemental language so that it can 
be utilized at the secondary and tertiary levels (Reichmuth: 1989; Unoh: 1985). Arabic 
also has its place in the education system, particularly in the northern region in Islamic 
school environments or even simply with the teaching of the Koran. As provided by the 
Constitution, regional indigenous languages can be utilized along with English for 
conducting “business” for state governmental affairs, such as in the House of Assembly, 
and for other official purposes (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, 
Section 95). The government of Nigeria supports the promotion of a multilingual 
educational system because although it is well-known that the knowledge of the English 
language is important as a universal language inside and outside of Nigeria, it has been 
observed that the use of a mother tongue early on in the educational process helps 
provide “a necessary prerequisite for effective literacy acquisition,” (Akinnaso 1993: 
256).  This system also helps provide extended lingual access to the majority of the 
population to carry out with their daily affairs.  
The Nigerian institution of higher education, as noted previously, had been 
actively established since the end of the colonial era, and the states take pride in the high 
standards that have been set and achieved for tertiary education. The education system 
(the university system in particular) dealt with issues of federal neglect under the periods 
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of military rule, as funding was a little over half the amount as national defense spending. 
This angered many because Nigeria was not at war and the allocation of money to the 
military was corrupted by practices of patronage, and many riots and backlash resulted 
from funding cuts (Anugwom: 2002; Reichmuth 1989). Educational unions have had 
numerous problems with the federal government throughout Nigeria history, fighting 
over issues of funding and the quality of education, and it has been argued that the clash 
created by these unions with the government has actually perpetuated an educational 
crisis at the tertiary level, with the norm of the problems since the 1990s being that the 
systems are often overcrowded yet underfunded (Anugwom 2002).   
Summary 
Several key aspects of Nigeria’s history have led the nation down its current 
transitional path to democracy in its own unique way. First, the dominance of a military 
regime as a governmental structure since independence has opened a Pandora’s Box to a 
national distrust of civilian-led government, and authoritarianism and corruption were 
able to actively remain in the government for the forty years following decolonization. 
Secondly, the hugely diverse population of Nigeria and its unbalanced division since the 
colonial era has perpetuated a sense of ethnic and religious hostility amongst different 
groups and regions into the current decade. The federal structure of government that was 
implemented during decolonization was supposed to be able to curb regional conflicts 
that arose over time, but even divided power between a federal body and local subunits 
has been unable to effectively manage national conflicts over time.  
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The formal administrative institutions have been mostly stable since the 1999 
constitution, but violent ethnic clashes and terrorist groups have had a place in Nigerian 
society since the turn of the 21st century. Islamic states and authorities have still been 
battling against the federal government for forms of sovereignty over religious and legal 
mandates. With the most recent presidential election of Muhammadu Buhari in March 
2015, which was the first presidential election in Nigerian history that saw a peaceful 
transition of power to an opposition party, it will be interesting to see how democracy 
plays out over the next couple decades in a country that has long been dominated by 
sentiments of national disunity and disappointment.    
Observing the Polity IV democratic scale for Nigeria since independence to 2013 
(see Fig. 3), we can see the dramatic fluctuations between democracy and 
authoritarianism experienced through the various military coups that ruled. Nigeria 
started off with a relatively high democratic rating, around an 8 on the Polity IV graph, 
but once ethnic turmoil progressed up until the first military coup took over in 1966, 
democracy levels sharply declined. Democracy levels remained low until the four year 
period of civilian rule from 1979-1983, and during these four years we see democracy 
rise to a score of 7. However, with the return to military rule in 1983, the democracy 
score dropped back down to a -7 and remained low until the constitution of the Fourth 
Republic was drafted in 1999. Ever since the early 2000s, Nigeria’s democracy score has 
remained stagnant at a 4, but this score could rise in the next couple years since the most 
recent election in 2015 proved to be the most democratic in Nigerian history, with a 






Figure 3. Authority Trends, 1960-2013: Nigeria. “Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 
1946-2013.” n.p. The Center for Systemic Peace, 6 June 2014. Web. 17 April 2015. 
Conclusion 
After examining the two differing cases of post-colonization in Senegal and 
Nigeria, it is difficult for me to determine which of the two colonial empires, the French 
or the British, created a better environment to support a successful transition to 
democracy. The continent of Africa itself is encompassed by such tremendous diversity, 
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other nations. Even with the standards that the two colonial legacies maintained over their 
African colonies, discrepancies arose and adjustments were necessarily made by each 
empire to accommodate for the local conditions within each of their colonies. With 
regard to Senegal and Nigeria, both colonial empires had to accommodate for the Islamic 
presence within these colonies, and the policies that were implemented during the 
colonial era played out differently for each country after independence.  
Assessing the main differences between the two current independent African 
nations, several distinctions can be made that appear to have colonial roots attached. 
First, according to data collected by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, literacy rates in 
Nigeria appear to be slightly higher than those observed in Senegal, for both adult and 
youth populations (International Literacy Data 2013). These higher literacy rates could be 
attributed to the legal usage of native languages in primary education, linking back to 
Nigeria’s former relationship with British Indirect Rule, as well as the determination of 
the Nigerian government for establishing the formal educational institution of universal 
primary education throughout the nation since the colonial era. The diversity of the 
Nigerian formal educational institutions also provides more opportunities for students of 
different backgrounds to achieve an education that is more compatible with their needs 
and personal background. Since French is the dominant language is the primary language 
of instruction in Senegalese education and the formal educational system is structured 
that like of France’s, there could be difficulties that arise with attaining literacy since 
native languages are not as frequently utilized. Also, since missionary groups were the 
most common under the colonial era to establish systems of education within colonies, 
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particularly in the British colonies, a country like Nigeria with colonial ties to a Christian 
religion received more opportunities to establish educational institutions compared to the 
secular nature of the French colony, which did not have a strong missionary base in 
Senegal. 
Second, the more structured formal administrative institutions and hierarchy that 
was established in Senegal upon independence came directly from its colonial authority, 
and the Senegalese constitution was modeled incredibly closely to that of the French État. 
President Senghor’s Francophile mentality assured that his nation would carry out similar 
French policies and the relationship that was maintained with France provided 
transitional support, both economically and politically. The standard French colonial 
principles of Direct Rule and assimilation would appear, in the case of Senegal, to have 
actually aided in creating a stable governmental structure since independence. The 
Senegalese may not have always liked the implemented policies from France, but there 
were never any significant kinds of societal revolt or backlash that severely harmed the 
government and state structure of Senegal, and the country never fell under any kind of 
military coup throughout its independent history. The Senegalese État was strong and 
centralized from the beginning like that of the French, and regional governments and 
authorities were always down a level in terms of hierarchical power compared to the 
national government.  
I would argue that the most important administrative adoption from France was 
that of strict secularism within governmental and political policies throughout the years. 
In terms of proportion, Senegal is more of a true Islamic nation compared to Nigeria, yet 
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the influences of Islam and the religious conflicts that are associated with them have 
never reached such extremities in Senegal as they have in Nigeria. The small Christian 
minority in Senegal could have likely been oppressed by a strong Islamic majority since 
independence, but the nation has been able to maintain a mutual ethnic and religious 
respect between the two groups over time. I firmly believe the strong secular principle 
adopted from France contributes to this because without any allowance for religious 
favoritism in governmental policy, the two religions plus smaller indigenous religions do 
not have to compete against one another for preferred policies. The Senegalese 
government, like France, has always had zero tolerance for it. 
Nigeria on the other hand appears to be far more complicated. As noted, Nigeria 
also took a secular approach when creating the nation, but like that of Britain, its policies 
were more accepting and loose toward various religious groups within the country, also 
linking back to Indirect Rule during colonial times. Nigeria could be disadvantaged in 
this aspect compared to Senegal because Nigeria simply has a significantly more diverse 
ethnic and religious population, and Indirect Rule has thus provided for the requirement 
to be more accommodating. The British colonization of Nigeria may have been the major 
contributor to the country’s ethnic clashes due to poorly divided colonial territories that 
were drawn for convenience to manage Nigeria and with little regard to ethnic tribal 
boundaries. Regional distrust and competition resulted from this division and 
unfortunately didn’t fade away at the time of independence.  
Nigeria’s choice to adopt a federal system of government as a formal 
administrative institution, which has been seen by other former British colonies, 
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including India and Australia, was made with the intentions to provide regional 
sovereignties so the major ethnic groups residing within these regions wouldn’t feel 
oppressed by a national authority or by other regional interests (since Northern Nigeria 
had the most representation in the National Assembly). The federal system was weak 
from the start and initial prospects of democracy seemed hopeless with the rise of the first 
military coup less than ten years after independence. Also, the remnants of British 
indirect ruling policies can be seen throughout Nigerian history. The British, with Lord 
Lugard leading the charge, did not necessarily wish to provide significant administrative 
structures within Nigeria as a whole, aside from its more direct involvement in Lagos. 
The goal of the British was to come in and extract resources, while letting indigenous 
tribes rule over themselves as long as there were no significant conflicts that arose during 
the process. The lack of implemented structure from British Indirect Rule in Nigeria, I 
would argue, didn’t provide the country with adequate experience of self-governance nor 
did it provide and establish the political resources necessary for Nigeria to effectively 
manage its independent nation. Nigeria may have had a stronger base of educated citizens 
that were competent to involve themselves in political matters, but the lack of structure 
and experience prohibited that knowledge from being applied successfully.  
Finally, the formal judicial institutions that were adopted and modified from each 
colonial empire seem to contribute to the current state of democratization within each 
country. The strict adoption of the French Civil Code in Senegal provides more structure 
within the nation because every citizen is guaranteed the same legal rights and 
procedures. The one exception of the Islamic Familial Code does not significantly alter 
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the judicial system, as it does not have widespread jurisdiction accept for the areas of 
marriage and family matters for self-proclaimed Muslims. Nigeria’s formal judicial 
system again presents more nuances due to its high level of legal and judicial diversity. 
The plurality of formal institutions of common law, along with the informal institutions 
of Sharia law and customary law creates an interestingly unbalanced structure, and 
jurisdictions over certain cases can be confused at various levels. Nigeria’s rule of law is 
likely negatively affected by these competing judicial forces, and conflicts have certainly 
arisen over the years. Currently, the allowance of informal Sharia and other customary 
laws have sparked controversy since some procedures can be seen to be in contradiction 
to various modern provisions of human rights. 
Before I conducted my case studies, I was under the impression that the British 
formal institutions would provide more opportunities for democracy in the former 
African colonies upon independence than the French formal institutions for several 
reasons. Intuitively, it seems to me that the policy of Indirect Rule by the British would 
provide more opportunities for democracy to thrive compared to the policies of French 
Direct Rule and assimilation. Indirect Rule would appear to provide systems that promote 
self-government, cultural and religious freedom, and collaboration amongst fellow 
citizens, but these concepts unfortunately did not transition well to the Nigerian post-
colonial context. Likewise, the more oppressive methods of Direct Rule and assimilation 
from the French would appear to limit participation, limit individual freedoms and 
liberties while oppressing native identities, and prohibit self-sufficiency, but these 
policies translated into a relatively stable Senegalese government that provides for 
67 
 
political freedoms while lacking severe religious and ethnic conflict. The uniformity and 
structure that were established under Direct Rule seem to actually promote long-term 
democratic transitions even with the initial oppression of informal native and cultural 
institutions.  
To provide a visual display of the democratization trends of the two African 
countries I examined through this research, I utilized the Polity IV democratization scale 
that ranks countries on a scale of -10 to 10 to assess the level of democracy present 
within the countries each year. For these two countries, the beginning year is 1960 
(independence) and the most recently measured year is 2013. According to Polity IV 
data, Senegal’s democracy rating has incrementally increased throughout the years 
following independence, aside from the first few years after 1960 when there was an 
attempted military coup. Senegal currently falls around a 7 on the democratic scale, being 
an established democracy. The consistent regime instability in Nigeria throughout the 
years following independence is also well displayed through the Polity IV chart. The 
different fluctuations can be linked back to a different military coup or attempted civilian 
headed government up until the 1999 constitution was implemented. Nigeria falls 
currently at a score of a 4, being classified as an open anocracy (Polity IV Individual 
Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013, refer back to Figures 2 and 3).  
After completing these two case studies, I believe that France’s strict and 
structured formal institutions during colonization have better prepared its colonies for 
democratic transition upon independence compared to the loose and relatively flexible 
formal institutions implemented by the British. Aside from its formal educational 
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institutions, the French’s administrative and judicial institutions that were introduced into 
its colonies were successful because they left little room for ideological, religious, and 
ethnic clashes to ensue, whereas the more tolerant administrative and judicial institutions 
that were introduced by the British left room for societal debate and created discrepancies 
in jurisdictions and policies. Due to the nuances that are present within each differing 
African country, these two cases could be true to the general Franco- and Anglo-colonial 
trends in Africa, or they could be outlier cases that do not necessarily fit the standard 
African conditions under colonial rule. There are several former British African colonies, 
including South African and Botswana for example, that have incredibly high democratic 
ratings compared to Nigeria, and various former French African colonies such as 
Morocco and Cote d’Ivoire that have lower democracy scores than Senegal, as well as 
formerly French Algeria that experienced an incredibly violent civil war after 
independence. Each unique colonial background could have helped shape their 
democratic successes or failures in the modern era.  
If I were to continue my research on this topic, I think it would be beneficial to 
examine African colonies from both Francophone and Anglophone backgrounds that did 
not have as dominant of an Islamic presence to see how the results vary, if at all. Also, 
the country of Cameroon would present an interesting case to study since it had colonial 
ties to both France and Great Britain, along with Germany. The formal institutions of 
administrative procedures, implemented judicial systems, and implemented education and 
language polices that lingered from the colonial era still appear to be relevant in terms of 
democratization. However, other institutions not examined through this research, both 
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formal and informal, as well as the vast diversity within the continent of African and 
within each individual nation itself may be determining factors as to how democratization 
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